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MAGNA CARTA IN THE LATE MIDDLE AGES: OVER-MIGHTY
SUBJECTS, UNDER-MIGHTY KINGS, AND A TURN AWAY
FROM TRIAL BY JURY
David J. Seipp*
What did English lawyers know about Magna Carta in the fourteenth and fif-
teenth centuries? How did they talk about it? Did they regard the king as above the
law or subordinate to it? What did they make of the guarantees that we now think
were most important in Magna Carta, the guarantee of judgment of peers or the law
of the land, and of speedy justice? The evidence of the Year Books is that Magna
Carta was treated as a minor statute, that the king was or ought to be above the law
in many respects, and that trial by jury was a risk to be avoided, if possible, because
juries could be so easily intimidated.
Surely lawyers held no centenary celebrations of Magna Carta anniversaries in
1315, 1415, or 1515. The charter sealed by King John on June 15, 1215, at Runnymede
was almost completely unknown to lawyers in England’s royal courts in the decades
and centuries afterward. What lawyers and judges of the fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries knew as Magna Carta was the third reissue of the charter in 1225, the first
by John’s son Henry III on his own initiative.1
There are about 120 references to Magna Carta in the Year Books, the reports
of legal arguments and judgments in England’s common law courts from 1268 to
1535.2 But in none of these reports is there any mention that it was King John who
first granted a charter with most of these provisions. There are fifteen cases in the
Year Books mentioning other charters of King John.3 These charters of King John
were all specific individual grants of “liberties” in the sense of special privileges or
“franchises” to particular towns or religious houses. Often the issue in these cases
* Professor of Law and Law Alumni Scholar, Boston University School of Law. The
Author’s citations to early English law reports, known as the Year Books, depart from the
Uniform System of Citation and conform to the Author’s comprehensive database of the
Year Books, searchable at http://www.bu.edu/law/seipp [https://perma.cc/HZ8T-DLE3].
1 Sir John Baker, The Legal Force and Effect of Magna Carta, in MAGNA CARTA: MUSE
& MENTOR 65, 67 (Randy J. Holland ed., 2014); Sir John Baker, Introduction to SELECTED
READINGS AND COMMENTARIES ON MAGNA CARTA: 1400–1604, 132 Selden Society xxxix–xl
(Sir John Baker ed., 2015) [hereinafter SELECTED READINGS]. Citations to Selden Society
volumes are hereinafter SS.
2 See infra pp. 672–78.
3 The first such case was the Bishop of Carlisle’s Case, Mich. 15 Edw. 2, pl. [34], fol.
453v–454r (C.P.) (1321.098); the last was Anon., Hil. 13 Hen. 4, Fitzherbert Aide de roy 99, fol.
34v (1412.040abr). Year Book citations are to the author’s database, http://www.bu.edu/law
/seipp [https://perma.cc/HZ8T-DLE3].
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was whether a particular local charter of King John was valid. And often the conclu-
sion was that it was not. For example, in 1346 the bailiffs of a town put forward a
charter of their liberties from King John by which John had granted that the townspeo-
ple should not be impleaded or implead in respect of contracts, trespasses or tenures
anywhere except in the town itself. The Court of Common Pleas held the charter void.4
In the London eyre of 1321, a charter that King John had granted in July 1199
putting the sheriffdoms of Middlesex to fee farm was challenged on behalf of
Edward II. A lawyer for the City of London argued that “the great charter says that
we are to have our liberties and our free customs,” a clear reference to a chapter of
Magna Carta.5 But there was no hint here or in any other case found in the Year
Books of any awareness that the “great charter” that this London lawyer or other
lawyers and judges were invoking was itself a charter first granted by King John.
Readings at the Inns of Court, lectures on statutes by senior lawyers for law
students, showed a slight but growing awareness of events of 1215. A reading on the
first chapter of Magna Carta that survives in six manuscripts, probably dating to
sometime in the fifteenth century, began by noting that King Henry III made this
great charter for the amendment of the realm, before which only common law was
used, and a treaty which was made at Runnymede.6 King John and his barons were
at war with each other before and after his grant of the 1215 charter, so it could be
characterized as a temporary truce or treaty. Another reading of uncertain date gave
a bit more of the history:
Before the making of this statute there was no law except custom
and common law . . . . King John wanted to destroy the law and
have his own will. And for this reason the lords of the lands
wished to depose him . . . and because of the fear of these barons
and other lords he [John] made this law in writing. And after this
King Henry III confirmed this law of his good will without co-
ercion and it was sealed with his great seal.7
This mention of King John’s fear of the barons, contrasted with the lack of coercion
against Henry III, suggests that lawyers who knew the history of the 1215 events
4 Anon., Hil. 20 Edw. 3, pl. 35, RS 117 (1346.035rs).
5 R. v. Mayor of London, 14 Edw. 2, Civil. pl. [81], 86 SS 252, 253–54 (London Eyre)
(1321.234ss). Fee farm was a transaction by which an annual fixed rent was paid in return
for the right to collect the profits, in this instance, of holding sheriffs’ courts in Middlesex
County. Id. The lawyer’s reference is to chapter 9 of the 1225 Magna Carta. Id. References
hereafter to Magna Carta are to the 1225 reissue, unless otherwise noted.
6 THE RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES OF THE ENGLISH CHURCH: READINGS FROM THE PRE-
REFORMATION INNS OF COURT, 129 SS 71 (Margaret McGlynn ed., 2012) (reading two,
probably composed sometime between 1409 and 1496) [hereinafter RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES].
7 RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES, supra note 6, 129 SS 82 (reading four, of uncertain date).
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would have thought that John’s grant of the charter was void for duress. That, at
least, provided grounds for Pope Innocent III to declare the 1215 charter null and
void a few months after it was sealed.8 This reading went on to state that Henry III’s
son Edward I had inspected his father’s great charter and made it a statute.9
Another reading from the late fifteenth or early sixteenth century said that these
ordinances were first made in the time of King John, then were granted by patent by
his son Henry III, then were made a statute in 1267.10 A reading at Gray’s Inn, circa
1506, referred to “the charter of Runnymede,”11 and a reading at Inner Temple in
1511 stated that King John by his charter granted the English church’s liberties,
“and it was further granted that if he broke any article of this [charter] that certain
of the . . . barons could oppose him, and then for breaking the charter they did so[,]”
after which Henry III granted this charter again in the ninth year of his reign, 1225.12
This 1511 passage appears to be the first indication of a lawyer who noticed chapter
61 of the 1215 charter, the security clause, which did not appear in any later version.
A Gray’s Inn reading of 1522 said that Magna Carta was made by King John and at
Runnymede by compulsion, then afterwards by Henry III.13 A reading of the early
1530s, composed in English, stated that “the statute of Magna Carta” was made in
the time of King John.14 The author of a treatise, circa 1558, mentioned having seen
a “statute” of Runnymede that King John was compelled to accept and that differed
from the Magna Carta the author knew, that of 1225.15
Thus, by the early sixteenth century, there were growing hints of an awareness
among lawyers of King John’s charter, but also some confusion about whether it
bore at its origin the character of a charter, a treaty, or a statute. A century later, Sir
Edward Coke, in a passage not published until 1644, showed that he knew that King
John in the seventeenth year of his reign had granted a precursor of the great charter
8 Bulla Innocentii Papae III pro rege Johanne, contra barones (Aug. 24, 1215), in British
Library, Cotton MS Cleopatra E I, fols. 155–156 (Etsi Kavissimus) (reciting that “by force
and by fear” John “was impelled to enter into” this agreement with his barons, thus making
it “as unlawful and unjust as it was base and shameful”).
9 RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES, supra note 6, 129 SS 82.
10 RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES, supra note 6, 129 SS 87 (reading six, probably composed after
1483 and before 1509). The Statute of Marlborough, 52 Hen. 3, ch. 5, 1 STATUTES OF THE
REALM 20 (Eng.) [hereinafter STAT. REALM], confirmed Magna Carta.
11 SELECTED READINGS, supra note 1, 132 SS xxxix n.5, 362 (reading by Richard Hesketh).
12 RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES, supra note 6, 129 SS 96 (reading seven, by Richard Snede).
13 RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES, supra note 6, 129 SS 128 (reading eight, by Robert Chaloner).
14 RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES, supra note 6, 129 SS 139 (reading ten).
15 SELECTED READINGS, supra note 1, 132 SS xxxix n.5, 366 (treatise probably by
William Fletewood). A reading perhaps composed in the 1550s stated that “King John was
disliked by his subjects for his tyranny,” that “the peers moved civil war against the king, and
in the end they compelled him at Runnymede . . . to agree to peace . . . where, at the request
of all the realm, he wrote a charter and called this the statute of Runnymede.” RIGHTS AND
LIBERTIES, supra note 6, 129 SS 133 (reading nine). The reader added, “I have seen this
charter myself and it differs in many places from Magna Carta[.]” Id.
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made by Henry III.16 The source on which Coke relied, however, was Matthew
Paris’s chronicle. This provided Coke with a text that was closer to the 1225 version
than to the 1215 original,17 so that he did not realize the extent of the differences
between the two. Explorations into the 1215 origins of Magna Carta interested only
those rare bibliophiles with an antiquarian bent, and were not the concern of the
legal profession at large.
Thus the 1215 text with its sixty-three chapters, so much the study of legal his-
torians today and ever since its publication by William Blackstone in 1759,18 was
not the text of Magna Carta that lawyers knew in late medieval and early modern
England. Manuscript statute books in the hands of lawyers in England all began with
Magna Carta, and the text that nearly all of these statute books contained was the
1225 third reissue of the charter.19 They knew it only as that charter of Henry III, or
as a statute of Edward I, dated 1297. They knew little or nothing about the security
clause of the 1215 charter, giving a commission of twenty-five barons the right to
seize the king’s castles and lands if he failed to observe his charter, which never
appeared in any later version. If the original 1215 text had been known to and
venerated by lawyers of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries as it is now by us,
England might have had a very different constitutional history. Instead, the few
lawyers who knew anything of the 1215 charter seemed to regard it merely as a
temporary treaty or a grant made under duress.
David Carpenter has made an exhaustive search for manuscripts containing the
text of the original 1215 charter of King John. With the help of Paul Brand, Nicholas
Vincent, and Susan Reynolds, Carpenter has identified, besides the four surviving
originals, thirty-four manuscripts with complete or partial texts or variations of the
1215 charter, or in two cases, French translations.20 One of these thirty-four was in
the Red Book of the Exchequer, three in London’s Liber Custumarum, twenty in
abbey, priory, or cathedral cartularies or chronicles, and seven in statute books.21
Statute books were manuscript collections of legislation and other legal texts.22 Any
ordinary lawyer or frequent litigant might possess a statute book, and lend it out to
16 EDWARD COKE, Proeme to THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND (1644), (fourth unnumbered page) (“[I]t was no new declaration: for king John in
the 17 yeare of his raigne had granted the like[.]”).
17 The textual confusion left by Matthew Paris for Coke and others is explained in J. C.
Holt, The St Albans Chroniclers and Magna Carta, 14 TRANSACTIONS ROYAL HIST. SOC’Y
67–88 (5th ser. 1964).
18 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, THE GREAT CHARTER AND THE CHARTER OF THE FOREST (1759).
19 See Baker, SELECTED READINGS, supra note 1, at xxxix–xl.
20 See MAGNA CARTA PROJECT, http://magnacarta.cmp.uea.ac.uk/read/magna_carta
_copies [https://perma.cc/ZUD8-93KU].
21 All identified in id.
22 See THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL’S COLLECTION OF MEDIEVAL ENGLISH MANUSCRIPT
STATUTE BOOKS AND REGISTERS OF WRITS, AMES FOUND., http://amesfoundation.law.harvard
.edu/digital/StatsAndRegWrits/ [https://perma.cc/5CUL-UCMC].
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be copied and passed on. Of the hundreds of statute books surviving from the four-
teenth and fifteenth centuries, nearly all began with the usual 1225 charter of Henry
III or the 1297 confirmation of Edward I. Carpenter has found seven that began
instead with some version of the original 1215 text extorted from King John.23 At
least two of these statute books followed the charter of Runnymede, as they titled
the 1215 text, with the more usual charter of liberties based on the 1225 text or a
hybrid of the 1225 and 1217 texts.24
So a few fourteenth- and fifteenth-century lawyers may have had access to the
original 1215 text of Magna Carta, or some garbled version of it, instead of the usual
1225 text or its 1297 statutory form. The indefatigable John Baker has spotted a
reading at Inner Temple, delivered in the year 1512, that quoted and discoursed
upon a text that appeared only in the 1215 charter and not in the 1225 version that
was in the lawyers’ books.25 That such an anomaly could occur should remind us
that every lawyer’s manuscript statute book differed to one degree or another from
every other copy.26
I. CONFIRMATIONS OF MAGNA CARTA
The story of Magna Carta in the law courts is a story of reception of the 1225
text.27 How one tells the story of Magna Carta in the fourteenth and fifteenth cen-
turies depends on what sources one uses. This Article focuses on the Year Books,
which are the sources that lawyers circulated in greatest numbers. The earliest surviving
examples date from 1268.
If a story were focused instead on the Parliament Rolls, it would be a story of
political gamesmanship. The 1225 reissue of Magna Carta was wrested from young
Henry III in exchange for a one-time concession of tax revenue.28 Most of the next
forty-four royal confirmations of Magna Carta were demanded by the Commons as
the price or part of the price of something the king wanted and the Commons could
23 Five of these manuscripts are British Library Harley MS 746, fols. 59v–64; Huntington
Library California MS H.M. 25782, fols. 1–6v; Cambridge University Library GG 1 12, fols.
21v–25v; Cambridge University Library Ee. 2. 19, fols. 1–5; and British Library Additional
MS 62534, fols. 1–5v.
24 These manuscripts are TNA E 164/ 9, fols. 44–47 and Lincoln’s Inn MS, Hale 140,
fols. 1–6.
25 SELECTED READINGS, supra note 1, 132 SS 210 n.1 (reading by Baldwin Malet on
chapter 27 of the 1215 text on ecclesiastical administration of intestate estates). This chapter
is discussed in R.H. Helmholz, The Church and Magna Carta, 25 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 425, 431 (2016).
26 See PETER M. TIERSMA, PARCHMENT PAPER PIXELS: LAW AND THE TECHNOLOGY OF
COMMUNICATION 154–55 (2010).
27 See id. at 146–47, 154–55.
28 After the final chapter of the 1225 charter, Henry III recited that it was granted in
return for the grant by the lords and commons of “the fifteenth part of all their moveables.”
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refuse to concede.29 Some of these confirmations, as Faith Thompson showed, were
in the statute rolls, some were in the parliament rolls only, some were in both, and
a few were documented in other sources.30 It became customary for the very first
petition of the Commons to the king at each new parliament to ask the king to promise
that Magna Carta, the Charter of the Forest, and all statutes not repealed should be
observed. The king assented, Le roy le voet.31
For two centuries, confirmations of Magna Carta were a bargaining chip to be
grudgingly given up by kings in negotiations with their subjects. But what did Magna
Carta mean to these bargainers? Individual petitions to the king in the rolls of par-
liament and other record sources show that complaints were made that the king had
dispossessed or executed individuals or misbehaved otherwise in violation of Magna
Carta.32 The political significance of Magna Carta, a reason why it seemed important
to get fresh royal confirmation of it every few years, was surely because it seemed
to signal some potential limitations on royal prerogative.
Year Books did not have these expressions of political struggle against the king.
This is because complaints about what the king did wrong did not find their way into
the reports of proceedings in the king’s courts of common law. Instead, in these
courts, lawyers and judges were busy building up an idea that we now call sovereign
immunity.33 No one could sue the king in his own courts. The only hope of redress
was by humble petition to the king.34 This did not stop lawyers and judges from re-
calling that there had been a time, under Henry III and before, when kings did have
to answer suits in their own courts, like any common person.35 As will be elaborated
in more detail later in this Article, the overwhelming lesson of the Year Books was
that the ordinary rules did not apply to the king.36
29 Faith Thompson, Parliamentary Confirmations of the Great Charter, 38 AM. HIST.
REV. 659, 660–72 (1933).
30 FAITH THOMPSON, MAGNA CARTA: ITS ROLE IN THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH
CONSTITUTION, 1300–1629, at 9–19 (1948); Thompson, supra note 29, at 660–72.
31 E.g., 4 ROTULI PARLIAMENTORUM 103a (no. 22) [hereinafter ROT. PARL.], 9 PAR-
LIAMENT ROLLS OF MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 196 (Chris Given-Wilson ed., 2012) (1416)
[hereinafter PROME]. An earlier example is 8 Edw. 3 (no. 1), in 4 PROME 197 (Seymour
Phillips & Mark Ormrod eds., 2005) (1334) (not in ROT. PARL.).
32 THOMPSON, MAGNA CARTA, supra note 30, at 39–67, 70–99. See generally Anthony
Musson, The Legacy of Magna Carta: Law and Justice in the Fourteenth Century, 25 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 629 (2016).
33 Guy Seidman, The Origins of Accountability: Everything I Know About Sovereign
Immunity I Learned from King Henry III, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 393, 423, 427, 43–36 (2005).
34 E.g., Anon., Mich. 3 Edw. 4, pl. 19, fol. 24b–26a (Exch. Ch.) (1463.020); Anon., Mich.
4 Edw. 4, pl. 3, fol. 25b (Exch. Ch.) (1464.050).
35 Corbet’s Case, Pasch. 35 Edw. 1, pl. [2], RS [467]–471 (C.P.) (1307.039rs) (Sjt.
Passelewe); Hadelow v. Rex, Hil. 22 Edw. 3, pl. 25, fol. 3a–3b (K.B.) (1348.025); Rex v. Abbot
of W., Trin. 24 Edw. 3, pl. 40, fol. 55b–56a (C.P.) (1350.100) (Willoughby J.C.P); Rex. v.
Prior of Lantony, Trin. 43 Edw. 3, pl. 12, fol. 21b–22b (C.P.) (1369.066) (Sjt. Cavendish).
36 See infra pp. 678–81.
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Faith Thompson dated the last confirmation of Magna Carta to 1423,37 but the
last express confirmation in the parliament rolls naming Magna Carta specifically
was in October 1416.38 In subsequent parliaments to 1423, the opening petition of
the Commons was more generally that liberties and franchises of the church, of lords
spiritual and temporal, of other lieges of the king, and of all cities and boroughs,
granted by previous kings, should be enjoyed. The king cautiously agreed as to liber-
ties and franchises that were in use, not repealed, and not capable of being repealed
by common law.39 Thereafter, to at least 1435, the same formula about liberties granted
to the church, to the lords, and to the commons, not revoked or revocable by the law
of England, was expressed no longer as petition and assent but as the chancellor’s
statement, in his speech opening parliament, about what the king had reportedly granted
in advance.40 Confirmations that started off as hard-nosed negotiations trailed off
into boilerplate petitions, then into pious speeches. Two centuries of confirmations
were enough.
It would be nice to suppose that the Commons stopped bothering to seek express
royal confirmation of Magna Carta after 1416 because its authoritative role in the
English legal system was too secure to need further bolstering. But in the context of
the fifteenth century, it would be foolish to suppose this. A decade and a half of
weak or absentee Lancastrian rule had left the rule of law a chancy thing. To be sure,
the king’s courts of common law were open for business. Complaints had been
mounting for decades before 1416, however, and would continue to increase, that
interference with legal proceedings by powerful lords, the problem of maintenance,
was getting worse, not better.41 If the king was interfering less than were mighty
dukes and earls, it was only because the king lacked power to do so.
After 1423, it seems more likely that confirmations ceased because everyone
thought of Magna Carta as more of a statute than a charter, despite its name. Kings
could revoke charters, as the Virginia colonists knew all too well when their own royal
charter was revoked in 1624.42 Confirmations assured that each new king remained
willing to abide by a predecessor’s charter according to its terms. But by 1416, lawyers
and judges had been uniformly regarding Magna Carta as a statute.43 It is true that
some statutes got confirmed by subsequent acts of Parliament, but these were
usually statutes which were so badly enforced that they needed fresh enactment.44
37 THOMPSON, MAGNA CARTA, supra note 30, at 19.
38 4 ROT. PARL. 103a (no. 22), 9 PROME 196 (1416).
39 E.g., 4 ROT. PARL. 253a (no. 43), 10 PROME 184–85 (Anne Curry ed., 2005) (1423).
40 E.g., 4 ROT. PARL. 481b (no. 3), 11 PROME 165 (Anne Curry ed., 2005) (1435).
41 See infra pp. 683–84.
42 See KEN MACMILLAN, SOVEREIGNTY AND POSSESSION IN THE ENGLISH NEW WORLD:
THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF EMPIRE, 1576–1640, at 102–04 (2006).
43 See infra pp. 672–76.
44 E.g., 1 Ric. 2, ch. 7, 2 STAT. REALM 3 (1377); 7 Hen. 4, ch. 14, 2 STAT. REALM 155
(1406) (confirming statutes against maintenance and giving of liveries).
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Magna Carta, no longer seriously considered a charter, was not seen to need new
royal confirmation after 1416, so long as it remained unrepealed as a statute.
II. MAGNA CARTA IN THE YEAR BOOKS
How did Magna Carta change from a charter to a statute? The slow transition
can be seen in the terminology of the Year Books. To set up this part of the story,
return to the high politics of the Parliament Rolls, and to the dramatic year 1399.
At the end of September 1399, Richard II was deposed from his throne. The
twenty-seventh of thirty-three grievances drawn up to justify his overthrow was that
Richard had put subjects on trial in his court of the constable and marshal, exposing
them to trial by battle, in violation of Magna Carta’s famous chapter 29 (numbered
39 in the 1215 charter). But grievance 27 described Richard’s wrongdoing without
specifically naming Magna Carta as the source of the prohibition. Instead, the Latin
passage stated merely that “although it had been decreed by statute and ordained,
and also until now maintained, that no free man should be arrested etc., or in any
way destroyed, nor should the king proceed, or order any process against him, unless
by lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land”—clearly this could only
be chapter 29—“nevertheless by the will, command and ordinance of the said king,
a great number of his lieges . . . were seized and imprisoned,”45 and so forth. Appar-
ently the substance of this charge against Richard II gained nothing by saying that
it was Magna Carta that Richard had violated, so those making the case for deposing
the king just said, “it had been decreed by statute and ordained,” and that Richard
had “wilfully violated” this unspecified statute.
Throughout the Year Books, there are about 120 passages in all that definitely
or probably refer to Magna Carta. Fully one-third of these, about forty Year Book
reports, do not use the words Magna Carta in Latin or grande chartre in French, but,
like the grievance against Richard II, refer to Magna Carta merely as “the statute.”
Of these forty cases that refer to Magna Carta as an unspecified “statute,” about
twenty are before 1399, ranging from 1309 through 1390, and the rest are from 1408
through 1535, the end of Year Book reporting.
One-third of references to Magna Carta in the Year Books refer to it, then, as a
statute like any other statute, not worth mentioning its name. Some of these are easy to
spot, such as “the statute that common pleas shall not follow our court”46 (chapter
11, 17 in the 1215 original), or “the statute that women shall have appeals of homicide
45 3 ROT. PARL. 420b (no. 44), 8 PROME 20–21 (1399). In Latin: quamvis statutum fuerit
et ordinatum, aceciam hactenus confirmatum, “Quod nullus liber homo capiatur etc. nec quod
aliquo modo destruatur, nec quod rex super eum ibit, nec super eum mittet, nisi per legale
judicium parium suorum, vel per legem terre[.]” A subsequent grievance accused the king of
wickedly infringing the liberties of the church approved in the great charter (in magna carta
approbatas). 3 ROT. PARL. 421a (no. 46), 8 PROME 21 (Chris Given-Wilson ed., 2005) (1399).
46 E.g., Bowser v. Colins, Mich. 22 Edw. 4, pl. 11, fol. 30a–33b (C.P.) (1482.128).
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only for the death of their husbands” (chapter 34, 54 in the 1215 original).47 Most
frequent was reference to “the statute that assizes will be taken in their own county,”
that is, where the disputed land was located (chapter 12, 14 in the 1215 original).48
Others are less certain. References to “the statute against mortmain” might mean
chapter 36 of Magna Carta (not in the 1215 original), or might have had in mind a
different statute of 1279.49
As will be shown, the predominant view in the Year Books was that Magna Carta
was an ordinary statute.50 In two early passages, however, provisions of Magna Carta
are not even attributed to some statute but to common law or “manifest law.” About
1304, the opening words of chapter 38, that bailiffs should not put a defendant on his
oath upon a plaintiff’s bare accusation, were quoted as “manifest law.”51 In 1310 it was
said that by common law (de comune ley) common pleas ought to be held in a certain
place (chapter 11).52 These hinted that Magna Carta might have restated or been
incorporated into the common law, a position later taken by Edward Coke.53
If this Year Book text of 1310 suggested that a provision of Magna Carta was
part of the common law, several passages in later Year Books seemed to ignore this
same provision of Magna Carta. In three reports of related cases of 1333 and 1334,
it was argued that common pleas were heard sometimes at one place, and sometimes
at another place, at the will of the king,54 unlike assizes, which it seemed, by a
different statute of 1285, had to be taken at a certain place.55 A century later in 1430,
Serjeant Rolf argued in Common Pleas that the king could change the place where
one must sue or the common day in this court, and could as well alter the judge.56
47 E.g., Brokesby v. Lord of Tiptost, Hil. 21 Hen. 6, pl. 12, fol. 28a–29b (C.P.) (1443.012);
see also Anon., Hil. 11 Edw. 2, pl. 40, 61 SS 263–264 (K.B.) (1318.040ss).
48 E.g., Hovel v. Rex, Trin. 19 Edw. 3, pl. 6, RS 139–145 (K.B.) (1345.105rs); THOMPSON,
MAGNA CARTA, supra note 30, at 59 & n.79.
49 E.g., Bydyke v. Kilburn, Trin. 4 Edw. 2, pl. 11, 42 SS 39–45, 186 (C.P.) (1311.138ss). The
reference could be to the statute De Viris Religiosis, 7 Edw. 1, stat. 2, 1 STAT. REALM 51
(1279) or to 18 Edw. 1, ch. 3, 1 STAT. REALM 106 (1290).
50 See infra p. 676.
51 Anon., Pasch. 32 Edw. 1, App. pl. [22], RS 516 (d) (1304.179rs).
52 Knoville v. Pluckenet, Mich. 4 Edw. 2, pl. 27, 22 SS 115–123 (C.P.) (1310.168ss) (Sjt.
Passelewe). Another passage, that “by common right” a widow ought to be endowed from
that of which her husband died seised as of fee, may be a reference to Magna Carta, ch. 7.
Outhinby v. Bridlington, Mich. 5 Edw. 2, pl. 11, 63 SS 30–33 (C.P.) (1311.258ss).
53 COKE, supra note 16, Proeme (fourth unnumbered page).
54 See Lovel v. Dagworth, Mich. 7 Edw. 3, pl. 47, fol. 57b–58a (C.P.) (1333.172); Anon., 7
Edw. 3, Lib. Ass. pl. 12, fol. 11b–12 (C.P.) (1333.225ass); see also THEODORE F. T. PLUCKNETT,
STATUTES AND THEIR INTERPRETATION IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY
62 (1922).
55 See Honel v. Dagworth, Hil. 8 Edw. 3, pl. 47, fol. 16a–17a (C.P.) (1334.046). The
1285 statute was Westminster Second, 13 Edw. 1, ch. 25, 1 STAT. REALM 84, referred to
assizes for profits, tolls, and such taken at a certain place.
56 Chancellor of Oxford’s Case, Hil. 8 Hen. 6, pl. 6, fol. 18b–21b (C.P.) (1430.006).
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Again in 1443, Chief Justice Newton and Justice Paston supposed that Common
Pleas could be removed to York, while Exchequer remained in Westminster Hall.57
These passages seem to ignore chapter 11, that common pleas should not follow the
king, but should be heard at a fixed place.
While forty passages refer to provisions of Magna Carta simply as “the statute,”
about eighty passages make express reference to Magna Carta. These are sharply
divided between those from 1276 to 1370, about forty in number, which refer nearly
always to la grand chartre in French, always translated as “the Great Charter,” and
those from 1406 to 1535, another forty or so, which refer nearly always to “the statute
of Magna Carta.” There are a very few outliers. There is one last reference to la grand
chartre in 1410,58 and one redundant invocation of the grand chartre of Magna
Carta in 1429.59 There are also marginal references and obvious interpolations intro-
ducing citations to Magna Carta in Year Books of 1354 to 1376, one of these in
1366 to statutum magnae chartae.60 Otherwise, in the dialogue and reporters’ notes
that make up the Year Books, the terminology is remarkably uniform, referring to
“the grand charter” before 1400, and to the “statute of Magna Carta” afterward.
Could this consistent pattern be simply a trick of the surviving sources? It seems
not. Year Book reports from the fourteenth century and before come equally from
scholarly editions of manuscripts and from early printed editions. Those from the
fifteenth century and later come almost entirely from early printed editions. There
appears to be no reason why copyists or early printers would systematically change
“Magna Carta” to “the statute” or change “the grand charter” to “the statute of Magna
Carta,” or vice versa. Reference to the grand charter persisted through nearly a cen-
tury of reports, and then afterwards citation to the statute of Magna Carta for more
than a century. Neither could have been the idiosyncrasy of an individual reporter.
The first references to the grand charter were spoken by Serjeant Walkingham
in 1276, in some of the earliest surviving Year Book cases. The grand charter pro-
vided that no free man was to be ejected from his free tenement except through the
law of the land.61 It provided that no one may get a writ of right in Common Pleas
to deprive a lord of his court.62 In 1311, Serjeant Denum said that the grand charter
provided “to no one shall we sell, or no one shall we deny,” etc., so the king’s pro-
tection should not delay Denum’s client’s plea.63 In 1369, the Master and Scholars
57 Noris v. Connesbroke, Mich. 22 Hen. 6, pl. 13, fol. 9b–12a (C.P.) (1443.072).
58 Anon., Mich. 12 Hen. 4, pl. 6, fol. 3b–4b (C.P.) (1410.130).
59 Anon., Pasch. 7 Hen. 6, pl. 27, fol. 31b–33b (C.P.) (1429.033).
60 Anon., Hil. 40 Edw. 3, pl. 11, fol. 5b–6b (C.P.) (1366.011).
61 Clerk v. Beauchamp, temp. Edw. 1, Beds. pl. 2, 122 SS 44–45, also 69 SS 105–106
(Bedford Eyre) (1276.012ss); MAGNA CARTA ch. 31 (1225).
62 Countess of Aumale v. Countess of Gloucester, (Trin.) 4 Edw. 1, pl. 1, 111 SS 48–50
(C.P.) (1276.002ss).
63 Horneby v. Abbot of Croyland, Mich. 5 Edw. 2, pl. 4, 63 SS 6–8 (C.P.) (1311.251ss).
A serjeant of the same name made the same argument in Anon., 14 Edw. 2, Customs pl. [1],
85 SS 54–56 (London Eyre) (1321.115ss).
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of Canterbury Hall petitioned the king to restore to them an advowson because their
ouster was entirely against the grand charter and various other statutes made for this
( purement contra la Grande chartre, & auters divers Statutes de ceo fait).64 As
mentioned above, forty cases in all between the 1270s and the end of the 1360s used
this form of reference to the grand charter. For the remainder of the fourteenth
century, provisions of Magna Carta were only described as “the statute.”
When they said la grand chartre, did fourteenth-century lawyers mean to be in-
voking a “great” charter? The word grand or graunt in French, like the word magna in
Latin, usually gets translated as “big,” “large,” or, in the context of a written document,
“long.” Magna Carta only got its name in 1217 when it had to be differentiated as the
“long” charter to contrast with the shorter Charter of the Forest.65 A town such as
Dunmow Magna in Essex got the appellation “magna” not because it was worthier
or more noble than Dunmow Parva, but simply because it was bigger.66 It was Edward
Coke who first explained in the early seventeenth century that the charter was called
Magna Carta, not because it was great in quantity, but in respect of the great impor-
tance, and weightiness of its matter.67 There is no way of telling how great, weighty,
or worthy Magna Carta seemed to lawyers of fourteenth- and fifteenth-century England.
Two early fourteenth-century cases gave Magna Carta the longer name “grand
charter of the liberties of England” (la graunte chartre de la franchise dEngleterre).68
Another early fourteenth-century case referred to the charter of liberties (chartre de
franchise), without the adjective grand,69 as did late thirteenth-century texts such as
Casus Placitorum, Brevia Placitata, and the Mirror of Justices.70 One plaintiff
claimed that his writ was given by the grand charter when it was not.71 This suggests
that it may have been invoked to lend some prestige, but no other instance of such
64 Master & Scholars of Canterbury Hall v. Rex, 43 Edw. 3, Lib. Ass. pl. 21, fol. 272a–272b
(Chan.) (1369.151ass).
65 Baker, SELECTED READINGS, supra note 1, 132 SS lxxv & nn.40–41; A.B. White, The
Name Magna Carta, 30 ENG. HIST. REV. 472, 473 (1915); Paul Brand, The First Century of
Magna Carta: The Diffusion of Texts and Knowledge of the Charter, 25 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 437, 439 (2016).
66 The place names are taken from Anon., Mich. 8 Hen. 6, pl. 17, fol. 9a (Assize)
(1429.101).
67 COKE, supra note 16, Proeme (first unnumbered page).
68 See Fulk the Butler’s Case, Trin. 6 Edw. 2, pl. 10, 36 SS 30–31 (C.P.) (1313.097ss);
Walcote v. Pershore, Mich. 10 Edw. 2, pl. 7, 52 SS 15–20 (C.P.) (1316.053). This formu-
lation is also found in NOVAE NARRATIONES, 80 SS 270 (C226) (Elsie Shanks & S. F. C.
Milsom eds., 1963).
69 Dagworth v. Edmundsbury, Pasch. 8 Edw. 2, pl. 22, 41 SS 172–173 (C.P.) (1315.060ss).
70 CASUS PLACITORUM, 69 SS 6 (no. 28) (William Huse Dunham, Jr. ed., 1950); BREVIA
PLACITATA, 66 SS 124 (no. 22) (G. J. Turner ed., 1947); THE MIRROR OF JUSTICES, 7 SS 79,
151 (W. J. Whittaker & F. W. Maitland eds., 1893). Brevia Placitata also made several references
to chartre de franchise as a term for grants of manumission or enfranchisement to individual
villeins. 66 SS 25, 70, 178.
71 Anon., Mich. 30 Edw. 3, pl. [51], fol. 25a–26a (C.P.) (1356.097).
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an imposture has been found. Most references to the grand charter in fourteenth-
century Year Books were made by pleaders in often unsuccessful arguments. Nearly
all concerned private disputes between individuals.72 Apart from the word grande,
which could mean simply “big” or “large,” they did not portray Magna Carta as a
particularly important or authoritative source of law.
In forty further cases, fifteenth- and early sixteenth-century Year Books referred
with almost complete uniformity to “the statute of Magna Carta.” One exception
was the 1429 statement by Serjeant Fulthorpe that the liberties of London were
assured by the “grand charter of Magna Carta.” Fulthorpe added that this meant they
were ratified and confirmed by Parliament, thus equating this grand charter with an
act of Parliament.73 In 1475 Justice Littleton said that Magna Carta was not a statute
at the beginning, until this was confirmed by the statute of Marlborough in 1267.74
Chapter 5 of the statute of Marlborough did indeed confirm that Magna Carta should
be observed in all its articles, as well in those that pertained to the king as in those
that pertained to others.75 Littleton’s larger point was that Magna Carta, when it did
get authority as a statute in 1267, was in affirmance of the common law. For better
or worse, in the eyes of fifteenth-century lawyers, Magna Carta was a statute.
Magna Carta got the same sort of treatment that other, later statutes got in Year
Book argument, which was pretty rough treatment.76 Like other statutes, some of its
chapters were expanded far beyond their words, a move that lawyers and judges
called, “the equity of the statute.”77 Other chapters of Magna Carta were interpreted
extremely narrowly. Fifteenth-century readings at the Inns of Court on chapter 29
of Magna Carta, as well as one Year Book case, show that the words “judgment of
his peers” were interpreted to apply only to the peerage of England, members of the
House of Lords, and to their privilege to be tried criminally only by their fellow
peers.78 The second part of chapter 29, that the king would not sell, deny, or delay
right or justice, was uniformly interpreted in these fifteenth-century readings to
apply only to the writ of right, a writ considered outmoded by the mid-thirteenth
century and very rare in the fifteenth,79 and to the writ justicies that commissioned
72 THOMPSON, MAGNA CARTA, supra note 30, at 33, 60.
73 See Anon., Pasch. 7 Hen. 6, pl. 27, fol. 31b–33b (C.P.) (1429.033) (chapter 9 of the
Magna Carta version).
74 Rex v. Bishop of Ely, Mich. 15 Edw. 4, pl. 17, fol. 11a–14b (Exch. Ch.) (1475.049).
75 Marlborough, 52 Hen. 3, ch. 5, 1 STAT. REALM 20 (1267).
76 See TIERSMA, supra note 26, at 146–47, 154–55.
77 E.g., Anon., Pasch. 12 Hen. 4, pl. 5, fol. 20a–20b (C.P.) (1411.025).
78 SELECTED READINGS, supra note 1, 132 SS 247 (15th c. ordinary gloss); 132 SS 253 (prob.
Lincoln’s Inn, c. 1491/1508); Preston v. Grey, Pasch. 10 Edw. 4, pl. 17, fol. 6b–7a; Neilson
pl. 16, 47 SS 63 (K.B.) (1470.035ss).
79 See FREDERICK POLLOCK, LAW OF TORTS 14 (2d ed. 1890); see also PAUL BRAND,
KINGS, BARONS AND JUSTICES: THE MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT OF LEGISLATION IN
THIRTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 11, 405 (2003).
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a sheriff to hold pleas in a county court.80 These were extremely constrained read-
ings that seem now to deny the obvious intention of the chapter.
The 120 cases that mentioned Magna Carta dealt with twenty-five of the thirty-
seven chapters of the 1225 charter. The most frequently referenced provision was
chapter 12, that assizes be taken in the counties where they arose. This would be
invoked in disputes about jurisdiction, as would two other provisions that were
among the seven most frequently invoked: chapter 24, that the writ praecipe not be
issued to deprive a lord of his court, and chapter 11, that common pleas be held in
a fixed place. The prohibition against mortmain in the 1225 charter (chapter 36), the
prohibition on waste by guardians (chapter 4), the guarantee of London’s liberties
(chapter 9), and one due process provision, chapter 14 on proportionate amercements,
round out the list of frequently cited provisions.
Year Book reports that mentioned Magna Carta are not particularly interesting as
a group. They arose nearly always in private litigation, individual against individual,
unrelated to any limitations on the king’s power.81 The charter was usually cited by
pleaders, not judges. Pleaders’ arguments based on Magna Carta were sometimes sec-
ond or third tries against an opponent’s position, often unsuccessful.82 By comparison,
Year Book reports contain ten times as many references to the statute of Westminster
Second (1285). As a statute, Magna Carta was not a notably important one.
The chapter of Magna Carta that became the best known in later centuries is almost
missing from the Year Books. Chapter 29 provided that the king would not proceed
against any free man without judgment of his peers or the law of the land, and would
not sell, deny, or delay right or justice (chapters 39 and 40 of the 1215 charter). It was
invoked in only four Year Book reports. One of these,83 in Casus Placitorum, got fairly
wide circulation, though it did not appear in Statham’s, Fitzherbert’s, or Brooke’s
Grand Abridgements. Two more, from Year Books of Edward II, were unsuccessful
or inconsequential arguments to avoid delays.84 Year Books of this reign did not cir-
culate widely and did not appear in any printed edition until 1678.85 The final chapter
29 case, dated 1470, circulated widely and was excerpted in the Abridgements. In
80 SELECTED READINGS, supra note 1, 132 SS 248 (15th c. ordinary gloss); 132 SS 251
(another 15th c. reading).
81 See supra p. 676.
82 E.g., Horneby v. Abbot of Croyland, Mich. 5 Edw. 2, pl. 4, 63 SS 6–8 (C.P.) (1311.251ss)
(attempt to avoid delay unsuccessful); Anon., Mich. 12 Hen. 4, pl. 6, fol. 3b–4b (C.P.)
(1410.130) (described in THOMPSON, MAGNA CARTA, supra note 30, at 61, as a “frivolous
exception[ ]”); Loveney’s Case, Pasch. 12 Hen. 4, pl. 5, fol. 20a–20b (C.P.) (1411.025) (third
argument against removal of an assize to Westminster).
83 Clerk v. Beauchamp, temp. Edw. 1, Beds. pl. 2, 122 SS 44–45, also 69 SS 105–106
(Bedford Eyre) (1276.012ss).
84 See Horneby v. Abbot of Croyland, Mich. 5 Edw. 2, pl. 4, 63 SS 6–8 (C.P.) (1311.251ss);
Anon., 14 Edw. 2, Customs pl. [1], 85 SS 54–56 (London Eyre) (1321.115ss).
85 See WILLIAM CRADDOCK BOLLAND, THE YEAR BOOKS 44 (1921); F. W. Maitland, Intro-
duction to 1 YEAR BOOKS OF EDWARD II: 1 & 2 EDWARD II A.D. 1307–1309, 17 SS xxi (1903).
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it, Justice Littleton stated that judgment of peers applied only to members of the
nobility tried by their fellow lords.86 The single briefest, clearest message imparted
from the Year Books is this: lawyers made Magna Carta boring. Based upon the Year
Books, one would not have predicted that Magna Carta would become a memorable
or important aspect of English law.
III. THE KING ABOVE THE LAW
How did Year Book lawyers treat some of the ideas that would later be found
essential to Magna Carta? Was the king above the law, or was he subject to the law?
Famous and much disputed passages in the thirteenth-century Bracton treatise put
the king under God and under the law, because law makes the king.87 But in the next
two centuries, two or three judges and lawyers in the Year Books can be found
taking the opposite view, that the king was above the law. Chief Justice Bereford
said in 1315 that one could not rely on legal principles against the king because he
was above the law.88 In the same case, a lawyer said that the king’s charter could be
judged only by the king, because he was without peer and above all law.89 In 1456,
a king’s serjeant argued that the king was above the law, and that no one could have
correction of the king.90 And in a standard early fifteenth-century reading on Magna
Carta, a lawyer repeated this commonplace that the king was above the law.91
Only once do we hear the rare echo of Bracton’s view that the king was ruled by
law, and that without law there would be no king. Chief Baron Fray said in 1441 that
the law was the highest inheritance that the king had, because by the law he himself
86 Preston v. Grey, Pasch. 10 Edw. 4, pl. 17, fol. 6b–7a; Neilson pl. 16, 47 SS 63 (K.B.)
(1470.035ss).
87 2 BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 33 (George E. Woodbine ed.,
Samuel E. Thorne trans., 1968) (fol. 5b, “rex . . . debet esse . . . sub deo et sub lege, quia lex
facit regem”); cf. 2 id. at 110 (fol. 34, “Rex habit superiorem, . . . legem per quam factus est
rex”.); id. at 306 (fol. 107b, “[N]ihil tam proprium est imperii quam legibus vivere, et maius
imperio est legibus submittere principatum . . . facit enim lex quod ipse sit rex.”).
88 Rex v. Prior of Hospital of St. John, Hil. 8 Edw. 2, pl. 33, 41 SS 73–76 (C.P.)
(1315.033ss) (Bereford C.J.C.P.: “deuers le Roy vous nauez nul fondement de ley qil est sur
la ley”); see also Knoville v. Plukenet, Mich. 4 Edw. 2, pl. 27, 22 SS 115–123 (C.P.)
(1310.168ss). In a King’s Bench plea roll of 1292, it was argued that the king himself was
above all law. SELECT CASES IN KING’S BENCH, 57 SS 68 (no. 33) (G. O. Sayles ed., 1938),
Coram Rege roll, no. 130 (Hilary 1292), m. 6.
89 Rex v. Prior of Hospital of St. John, Hil. 8 Edw. 2, pl. 33, 41 SS 73–76 (C.P)
(1315.033ss) (Sjt. Toutheby: “la chartre le Roy ne put estre iugge par autre qe du Roy et pur
ceo est il sanz piere et passe tote la ley”).
90 Rex ex rel. Grimsby v. Eyre, Mich. 35 Hen. 6, pl. 33, fol. 25b–29b, 51 SS 118, 120
(Exch. Ch.) (1456.087) (Sjt. Hindstone: “le Roy est desus la Ley . . . il est desus Ley, & nul
home ne poit aver correccion de luy”).
91 SELECTED READINGS, supra note 1, 132 SS 92 (“ordinary gloss” on ch. 11: rex est
supra legem).
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and all his subjects were ruled, and if there were no law, there would be no king and no
inheritance.92 Then Chief Justice John Fortescue, in writings composed when he was
in exile in the 1460s and not circulated until long after his death, took the position that
England’s king could not alter or add to the law without the consent of his subjects.93
All of these statements were made in the context of particular disputes, and all
could probably be reconciled by an ingenious lawyer of the time. A much larger
volume of Year Book arguments, also in disparate contexts, sent a strong message
that many rules of law did not apply to the king. There was a big distinction, it was
often said, un grande diversite, between the king and a common person.94 As a
lawyer said to his companions in 1292, “We cannot plead with the King in the same
way as we can with another person.”95 And the distinction between the king and
everyone else was always in the king’s favor.
It was reasonable, said Justice Choke in 1468, that the king be preferred over
any common person.96 Lawyers said in 1493 and 1497 that the king would be more
favored than any private person.97 The king could not be said to do wrong,98 nor to
be a disseisor nor a disturber, nor did time run against the king.99 The king could sue
in any court he pleased.100 Statutes, grants, patents, and charters were construed most
92 Rex v. Rector of Edington, Pasch. 19 Hen. 6, pl. 1, fol. 62a–65a (Exch. Ch.) (1441.028)
(Fray C.B. Exch.: “par la Ley il meme & touts ses subjects sont rules, & si s’ Ley ne fuit, nul
Roy, ny nul’ inheritance sera”).
93 SIR JOHN FORTESCUE: DE LAUDIBUS LEGUM ANGLIE 25 (S. B. Chrimes ed. & trans.,
1949). On the consistency of Fortescue’s thought in this regard, see John Guy, The Henrician
Age, in THE VARIETIES OF BRITISH POLITICAL THOUGHT, 1500–1800, at 13, 28 (J. G. A.
Pocock, et al. eds., 1993). Chief Baron Illingworth and Chief Justice Danby made a similar
point in 1465 that everyone had inherited the common law and that the king had no right to
defeat without parliament a law by which everyone had advantage. Rex v. Anon., Pasch. 5
Edw. 4, Long Quinto pl. [27], fol. 32b–34a (Exch. Ch.) (1465.059).
94 E.g., Rex v. Bishop of D., Hil. 38 Edw. 3, pl. [14], fol. 3b–4a (C.P.) (1364.014) (Thorp
C.J.C.P.); Abbot of Liral v. Dean of K., Trin. 38 Edw. 3, pl. [32], fol. 18b–19a (C.P.) (1364.084)
(Sjt. Fyncheden); Ferrers v. Cotton, Pasch. 7 Hen. 4, pl. 8, fol. 41b–43b (K.B.) (1406.058)
(Gascoigne C.J.K.B.); Anon., Pasch. 15 Edw. 4, pl. 2, fol. 23a–23b (C.P.) (1475.008) (Bryan
C.J.C.P.); Anon., Mich. 26 Hen. 8, pl. 4, fol. 8a (C.P.) (1534.045) (Shelley J.C.P.).
95 Rex v. Baskyvile, Trin. 20 Edw. 1, pl. [78], RS 113–115 (Hereford Eyre) (1292.127rs)
(Sjt. Kyngesmede).
96 Anon., Pasch. 8 Edw. 4, pl. 8, fol. 4a (C.P.) (1468.015) (Choke J.C.P.).
97 Abbot of Tewksbury’s Case, Trin. 8 Hen. 7, pl. 1, fol. 1a–5a (C.P.) (1493.011) (Sjt. Kebell
& Sjt. Fyneux); Burnly v. Halewel, Mich. 9 Hen. 7, pl. 5, fol. 8b–10b (Exch. Ch.) (1493.016)
(Boteler, Hobart A.G., Sjt. Rede, King’s Sjt. Wode, & King’s Sjt. Fysher); Dormer v. Rex., Trin.
12 Hen. 7, pl. 1, fol. 19a–22a (Exch. Ch.) (1497.005) (Hobart A.G. & Sjt. Kebell).
98 Anon., Trin. 1 Edw. 5, pl. 13, fol. 8a (Chancery) (1483.031); see Baker, Legal Force and
Effect, supra note 1, at 81–82.
99 Rex v. Radclif, Trin. 35 Hen. 6, pl. 1, fol. 60a–63b (C.P.) (1457.025) (Moyle J.C.P.);
Anon., Mich. 3 Edw. 4, pl. 19, fol. 24b–26a (Exch. Ch.) (1463.020).
100 Greneville v. Bishop of Exeter, Mich. 17 Edw. 3, pl. 21, RS 95–117 (C.P.)
(1343.161rs) (Hillary J.C.P.); see SELECTED READINGS, supra note 1, 132 SS 106.
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beneficially in favor of the king.101 A presumption resolved any uncertainties in the
king’s favor.102
Most of these pro-king passages are from the 1460s onward, but more than sixty
Year Book cases evenly spread between 1310 and 1500 document instances in which
courts were urged or moved to take some step “for the king’s advantage,” “to the
king’s advantage,” or “in the king’s advantage.”103 Sometimes the king’s advantage
coincided with one party’s interest, but in other instances both sides wanted to settle
their dispute but the court pursued it for the king’s advantage, whether that be pay-
ment of a fine, outlawry of a defendant, or keeping the peace.104
The privileged position of the king as litigant or interested bystander in his own
courts drew only rare criticism. In 1481, when Nottingham, Chief Baron of the
Exchequer, argued that it would be to the king’s better advantage to disallow a
charter, Serjeant Starkey rebuked the Chief Baron and the Justices, “Sir, you are not
to come here to argue to enrich the king (pur le lucre le Roy), but to administer
justice between the party and the king[ ].”105 Then again, how could the king’s
justices decide fairly between the king and any ordinary litigant? It was a longstand-
ing principle in the courts that one could not be a judge in one’s own cause.106 In
1430, half a century before Starkey’s outburst, the king’s Justices of Common Pleas
grappled with the implications of this principle for their own adjudication between
their king and ordinary litigants. Chief Justice Babington contended that an abbot’s
bailiff could properly judge disputes between the abbot and his tenants because the
101 Duchess of York’s Case, Trin. 9 Hen. 6, pl. 30, fol. 27a–28b (Exch. Ch.) (1431.086)
(Cheyne C.J.K.B.: “the king’s grant . . . shall be interpreted to the king’s greatest advantage”);
Rex v. Quatermains, Pasch. 37 Hen. 6, pl. 9, fol. 21a–22b (Exch. Ch.) (1459.016) (Nottingham
A.G.: every charter will be construed most strongly to the king’s advantage); Anon., Mich.
21 Edw. 4, pl. 28, fol. 55b–59b (C.P.) (1481.096) (Catesby J.C.P.: “this grant . . . will be
interpreted strictly for the king’s advantage”); Anon., Mich. 10 Hen. 7, pl. 24, fol. 10a–10b
(Chan.) (1494.064) (Fairfax J.K.B.: the king’s patents will be taken strictly, and the better for
the king); Anon., Trin. 12 Hen. 7, pl. 1, fol. 19a–22a (Exch. Ch.) (1497.005) (Sjt. Mordaunt:
“the king will not be bound . . . by [a] statute, unless he be named in [it] . . . but where a
statute is made that [is] beneficial for the king, notwithstanding that the king is not named
in the statute, yet the king will have avail of this statute”).
102 Anon., Mich. 5 Edw. 4, Long Quinto pl. [41], fol. 116b (C.P.) (1465.167); Dormer v.
Rex, Mich. 13 Hen. 7, pl. [3], fol. 4a–9b (Exch. Ch.) (1497.014) (Sjt. Kingsmill).
103 The first such case was Box v. Palmer, Pasch. 3 Edw. 2, pl. 14, 20 SS 91–92 (C.P.)
(1310.049ss), and the last was Anon., Hil. 14 Hen. 7, pl. 5, fol. 15a–16b (C.P.) (1499.005).
104 E.g., Anon., Pasch. 6 Edw. 3, pl. 4, fol. 12a (C.P.) (1332.032); Anon., Trin. 13 Edw.
3, pl. 7, RS 303–305 (1339.122rs); Sutton’s Case, Mich. 21 Hen. 6, pl. 43, fol. 21b–22a
(C.P.) (1442.139); Anon., Mich. 4 Edw. 4, pl. 19, fol. 36b–37a (C.P.) (1464.066).
105 Rex v. Abbot of Waltham, Mich. 21 Edw. 4, pl. 6, fol. 44b–49b (Exch. Ch.) (1481.074)
(Sjt. Starkey).
106 E.g., Verdun’s Case, Trin. 21 Edw. 1, pl. 3, RS 155–57 (C.P.) (1293.204rs); Abbot of
Battle’s Case, Hil. 35 Hen. 6, pl. 18, fol. 54a–55a (C.P.) (1457.018).
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law presumed that the abbot’s bailiff would be an impartial judge, “as we are
between the king and others . . . , and yet we are judges by the king’s authority[.]”107
Chief Justice Thirning had made the same point twenty years before Babington did,
that an abbot’s bailiff could do right between his master and the tenant, the same as
Thirning and his fellow justices could do between the king and another of his
people.108 A lawyer made the point again in 1496 that the Court of Common Pleas
was indifferent between the king and a common person.109 But this was impartiality
in a system of rules that already gave heavy weight to the king’s interest, and had
king’s serjeants in attendance to watch for and to grasp any advantage.110
While the distinction between the king and every other person loomed large in
the Year Books, there was almost no acknowledgment of different legal rules for
lords and for commoners. The only instance found was Justice Littleton’s statement
in 1470 that Magna Carta chapter 29 gave lords a trial by their peers, and not as a
common person would be tried.111
In the Year Books, the king was above the law more often than he was subject
to it. The king got the benefit of exceptions, presumptions, and advantages that
systematically put his interest above that of every common person. It was good to
be the king. All the king’s subjects were lumped together as common persons who
had to play by the ordinary rules and didn’t get the benefit of the king’s many ad-
vantages. Lawyers seemed to have abandoned the spirit of Magna Carta, or at least
the spirit that Magna Carta was to take on a century later, of law as a check on royal
power. Instead, lawyers lined up on the king’s side.
IV. OVER-MIGHTY SUBJECTS, UNDER-MIGHTY KINGS, AND THE
PROBLEM WITH TRIAL BY JURY
Thus, the story told by the Year Books, especially in the fifteenth century, was
that lawyers and judges treated Magna Carta as a statute, and not a particularly im-
portant statute. If the idea of Magna Carta was that the king was subordinate to the
law and must follow the same rules applicable to everyone else, Year Book lawyers
and judges for the most part opposed this. They tried in many ways to enhance the
power of the king in his law courts and to create exceptions for the king from the
107 Chancellor of Oxford’s Case, Hil. 8 Hen. 6, pl. 6, fol. 18b–21b (C.P.) (1430.006).
108 Abbot of Glastonbury’s Case, Hil. 12 Hen. 4, pl. 3, fol. 12b–13b (C.P.) (1411.003)
(Thirning C.J.C.P.).
109 Brook v. Latimer, Mich. 12 Hen. 7, pl. 7, fol. 11a–13b (C.P.) (1496.052) (Sjt. Mordaunt).
110 MARGARET HASTINGS, THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS IN FIFTEENTH CENTURY
ENGLAND 78–79 (1947).
111 Preston v. Grey, Pasch. 10 Edw. 4, pl. 17, fol. 6b–7a, Neilson pl. 16, 47 SS 63 (K.B.)
(1470.035ss) (Littleton J.C.P.).
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ordinary rules of law. There was a big distinction between the king and everyone
else, who were all common persons, and that distinction was that the king, in many
respects, was above the law.
Why didn’t fifteenth-century lawyers and judges embrace the spirit of Magna
Carta? Why didn’t they understand that their legal system needed to constrain the
authority of the king and to guard continuously against the king’s tendency to ex-
pand his power? The answer, it would appear, lies in the political history of Lancastrian
and Yorkist England.
In 1399, Richard II was not strong enough or popular enough to keep Henry IV
from usurping his throne.112 Henry IV exhausted himself fighting off rebellions for
much of his reign. Next, Henry V was popular as a military leader, but as a military
leader he spent most of his reign fighting in France or preparing to fight in France.
His son Henry VI was king at nine months of age, a helpless infant, then an ineffec-
tual king, easily manipulated, then a king beset by mental illness. Civil war ensued,
and Edward IV seized the throne from Henry VI, restoring Richard II’s rightful heir
after sixty years of usurpation. Edward was more competent, but he too needed
support from his former enemies to keep his throne. Then Edward lost his throne for
almost a year to former allies who brought old Henry VI back in his place. Finally,
Richard III, another usurper, also faced immediate rebellion and remained insecure
and increasingly reckless during his short reign.
All of these kings were chronically short of money to pay soldiers, to run the
royal establishment household, and to buy much-needed support.113 They only kept
precarious hold on their throne by keeping a preponderance of magnates on their
side, and they could only do this by granting concessions, paying retainers, and par-
doning the flagrant wrongdoings of these magnates.114 In the 1460s, Chief Justice
Fortescue wrote a book in praise of the laws of England, without a single word
about Magna Carta.115 In his other book about the governance of England, Fortescue
admitted that the king needed a more secure source of revenue. In particular, he
wrote about the danger of “over-mighty subjects” with resources and retinues that
rivalled the king’s own.116 This was a recipe, Fortescue said, for rebellion. Fortescue’s
“over-mighty subjects,” the powerful magnates, were descendants and successors
112 The account in this paragraph could be drawn from any standard history of the period.
The Author consulted entries in the OXFORD DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY. See
generally GERALD HARRISS, SHAPING THE NATION: ENGLAND, 1360–1461, at 405–639
(2005); E. F. JACOB, THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY: 1399–1485, at 406–62 (1961).
113 HARRISS, supra note 112, at 19–21, 28–30; JACOB, supra note 112, at 437–46.
114 See HELEN LACEY, THE ROYAL PARDON: ACCESS TO MERCY IN FOURTEENTH-CENTURY
ENGLAND 100 (2009); J. R. Lander, Attainder and Forfeiture, 1453 to 1509, 4 HIST. J. 119,
125 (1961) (focusing on political use of pardons to consolidate support).
115 See generally FORTESCUE: DE LAUDIBUS LEGUM ANGLIE, supra note 93.
116 SIR JOHN FORTESCUE, THE GOVERNANCE OF ENGLAND: OTHERWISE CALLED THE DIFFER-
ENCE BETWEEN AN ABSOLUTE AND A LIMITED MONARCHY 127–30 (Charles Plummer ed., 1885).
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of King John’s barons of 1215. But now, in the vacuum left by weak kings, these
over-mighty magnates were acting as if they themselves were above the law.
This was a problem long in the making. In the fourteenth century, some royal jus-
tices took annual “retainers,” payments from magnates to look after their interests.117
Some members of the nobility engaged in repeated, violent crimes with impunity,
a phenomenon memorably dubbed “fur-collar crime” by Barbara Hanawalt.118 These
highborn felons could count on pardons from the king, who needed their and their
families’ support.119
To a greater extent than in previous centuries, fifteenth-century kings delegated
or abdicated local administration to these powerful local lords.120 With kings so
weak, the rule of law was not well-observed. These dukes, earls, barons, and other
powerful lords, Fortescue’s “over-mighty subjects,” kept private armies, took what
they wanted, and attacked their enemies with impunity. They settled disputes among
their own tenants, supporters, and friends, often without resort to the king’s law
courts, and they interfered with legal proceedings whenever they liked.121
When one of their own people sued or was sued in the king’s courts, the most
powerful of these lords made sure that their tenant won. Magnates would do this by
threatening or bribing jurors, or the sheriffs who summoned jurors, or the lawyers
or judges themselves. It was enough if a powerful man merely came into court and
stood next to one party in a trial.122 The jury would be too afraid to decide against
a litigant with powerful friends. The word for this kind of interference with legal
proceedings was “maintenance.”
Maintenance had been a problem long before the fifteenth century. Statutes con-
demned it ever since 1275. A steady succession of statutes thereafter down to 1429
repeated the condemnation of maintenance.123 Petitions in the Rolls of Parliament
117 See generally J. R. MADDICOTT, LAW AND LORDSHIP: ROYAL JUSTICES AS RETAINERS
IN THIRTEENTH- AND FOURTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND (1978).
118 Barbara A. Hanawalt, Fur-Collar Crime: The Pattern of Crime Among the Fourteenth-
Century English Nobility, 8 J. SOC. HIST. 1, 1–17 (1975).
119 See MICHAEL HICKS, THE WARS OF THE ROSES 1455–1485, at 34 (2003), and sources
cited supra note 114.
120 See Edward Powell, Law and Justice, in FIFTEENTH-CENTURY ATTITUDES: PERCEPTIONS
OF SOCIETY IN LATE MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 29, 35 (Rosemary Horrox ed., 1994) (stating that
the crown relied heavily on local society to enforce the law and maintain public order).
121 Charles Plummer, Introduction to FORTESCUE, GOVERNANCE OF ENGLAND, supra note
116, at 19–20. For a case of such maintenance, see David J. Seipp, Jurors, Evidences and
the Tempest of 1499, in “THE DEAREST BIRTH RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE OF ENGLAND”: THE
JURY IN THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 75, 80, 83 (John W. Cairns & Grant McLeod
eds., 2002).
122 Seipp, supra note 121, at 75, 80, 83; see also May v. Fogge, Mich. 22 Hen. 6, pl. 43,
fol. 24a–24b (C.P.) (1443.102) (suggesting that mere presence in court was maintenance).
123 See A. H. Dennis, The Law of Maintenance and Champerty, 6 LAW Q. REV. 169, 170–73
(1890); Percy H. Winfield, The History of Maintenance and Champerty, 35 LAW Q. REV. 50,
51–53, 56–67, 69–70 (1919) (citing a variety of such statutes).
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and resolutions of the king’s council in the fifteenth century continued the steady
and mounting stream of complaints about maintenance and maintainers.124 Year
Books show something of a peak of maintenance, or at least of courtroom discussion
about maintenance, in the 1440s and 1450s. Lawyers and judges openly discussed
in these mid-fifteenth-century cases how their courts should respond to open, public,
brazen threats to jurors, attorneys, Justices of the Peace, and others.125
Charles Plummer, in 1885, condemned the behavior of these powerful magnates
as “bastard feudalism.”126 The label has proved difficult to define or to confine
chronologically or geographically. K. B. McFarlane provided the inevitable correc-
tion in the mid-twentieth century. He wrote that magnates were merely modeling
“good lordship,” merely doing what their tenants and society at large expected of
them.127 McFarlane memorably flipped Fortescue’s diagnosis of the problem: “It is
only under-mighty kings who have over-mighty subjects.”128 Lawyers and judges
administering the common law in the courts of these under-mighty kings would not
have the same regard for Magna Carta that we have today.
In the fifteenth century, most lawyers and judges would have felt a need to em-
power their king, to assert advantages, privileges, and prerogatives for him,129 not to
hedge him about with restrictions and limitations. They may well have been wrong
about this. Even weak kings would oppress their enemies and give their favorites
unfair advantages, when they could get away with it; and they would use their courts
to do so.130
But Year Book lawyers and judges were more worried about over-mighty
magnates disrupting their orderly proceedings than about their under-mighty king
doing so. They expected that their king would view interference with his law courts
as an affront to his dignity. They wanted their king to be strong enough to be ca-
pable of punishing such contempt. In later decades, of course, they got what they
124 E.g., 5 Hen. 6, no. 16, 5 ROT. PARL. 408b (no. 16) (1426); 8 Hen. 6, 4 ROT. PARL. 344a
(no. 16), 10 PROME 394 (1429); 11 Hen. 6, 5 ROT. PARL. 434b–435a (no. 19) (1433).
125 See, e.g., Anon., Mich. 19 Hen. 6, pl. 60, fol. 31b (1440.078) (in which the plaintiff alleged
that a servant of the defendant threatened three jurors so that these and other jurors were put
in fear if they gave a verdict against the defendant). Compare Mich. 32 Hen. 6, pl. 14, fol. 9a
(1453.027) (noting that a “large [and] unruly crowd” caused a “fear of intimidation”), with
Anon., Pasch. 36 Hen. 6, Fitzherbert Maintenance [22], fol. 65r (C.P.) (1458.066abr) (in
which Prysot C.J.C.P. said that for a powerful man to pronounce that a litigant’s charters
were good was grave maintenance).
126 Plummer, supra note 121, at 15.
127 See generally K. B. MCFARLANE, THE NOBILITY OF LATE MEDIEVAL ENGLAND (1973).
128 Id. at 179.
129 See supra pp. 678–81.
130 See B. C. Keeney, 8 U. TORONTO L.J. 150 (1949) (reviewing MARGARET HASTINGS,
THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS IN THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY: A STUDY OF LEGAL ADMINIS-
TRATION AND PROCEDURE (1947)).
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wished for. Henry Tudor and his son Henry VIII swung the balance of power sharply
in the other direction.131 The Tudors reminded lawyers how much they needed checks
on royal power, and slowly during the sixteenth century, Magna Carta again began
to be seen by lawyers and judges as a much-needed counterweight against the power
of the king.132
Fifteenth-century lawyers and judges made other attempts to counter over-mighty
magnates who interfered with legal proceedings, attempts that show another reason
why in that century Magna Carta lacked the impact that it would later have. Three
important legal developments in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries can be seen
as efforts to turn away from the traditional process of trial by jury. Magna Carta had
promised “the law of the land or judgment of one’s peers.”133 But the problem of
maintenance in fourteenth- and fifteenth-century England meant that ways had to be
found to take cases out of the king’s ordinary courts of law and away from trials by
juries, or at least away from those juries most susceptible to local magnate intimidation.
First, staying within the common law, lawyers and judges expanded the traditional
scope of some writs, and at the same time relaxed their rules about venue and juris-
diction, all in ways that seem to have been intended to avoid local intimidation of juries.
Second, when their clients faced magnate opposition in the ordinary courts of com-
mon law, lawyers petitioned to the chancellors’ new court of equity. And third, they
made frequent use of arbitration, again thought to be safer from magnate interference.
The first development reconceived lawsuits and rules about venue and jurisdic-
tion. In a Year Book report of 1413, Chief Justice Thirning of Common Pleas made
a very revealing comment. He said that in Assizes—in those trials that Magna Carta’s
chapter 12 required to be held in the county where the land in dispute was located—
there was so much maintenance in the countryside that plaintiffs had to be able to
use writs of trespass to contest freehold title to land.134 The premise of the Chief
Justice’s observation was that in 1413 a jury from the locality where the land in
dispute was located could not be expected to give an honest verdict. There was too
much maintenance. With a writ of trespass, however, a plaintiff could lay the venue
fictitiously in some other, distant county where there was less danger of intimidation
of the jury. This 1413 passage was also a remarkably perceptive realization about
131 Joel Hurstfield, Was There a Tudor Despotism After All?, 17 TRANSACTIONS ROYAL
HIST. SOC’Y 83, 101, 105–08 (5th ser. 1967).
132 SELECTED READINGS, supra note 1, 132 SS lxxvi, at 362–63 (identifying Richard
Hesketh of Gray’s Inn in 1506 for the reading: “this royal charter which grants liberties to
all subjects for their common wealth shall be construed more strongly against the king and
more beneficially for his subjects, in favour of liberty”).
133 MAGNA CARTA ch. 29 (1225).
134 Anon., Hil. 14 Hen. 4, pl. [53], fol. 35a–36b (C.P.) (1413.053). Thirning C.J.C.P.
added that one could sue in a writ of Debt for rent, which would also permit a plaintiff to lay
the venue in another county to avoid maintenance. Id.
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a major change that was happening at the time in substantive law, the trend of using
personal actions to replace real actions.135
The broader idea was that a plaintiff should be able to move the venue of an
action away from the place where traditional rules of common law would have put
it, if traditional venue was a place where a jury would be bribed, threatened, or
simply overawed by “a powerful man.” This broader idea was discussed in cases of
1440, 1441, 1453, and 1455.136 Chief Justice Newton said in 1441 that if you took
his goods with force in Middlesex, and because you were a powerful man in the
same county, he would doubt that the truth would be found there, then he was going
to bring his writ at York.137
The Bill of Middlesex, that famous fifteenth-century fiction which expanded the
jurisdiction of King’s Bench,138 may also have begun as a means to shift the venue
away from the home county of a powerful defendant or his powerful backer. In this
world of over-mighty magnates, maintenance was real, and it impinged most
directly on the weakest spot of common law procedure, trial by jury. Lawyers and
judges facilitated alternatives to the traditional scope of writs and to venue rules for
jury trial, rules and doctrines that had been developed back in thirteenth-century
England. Magna Carta, with its guarantees of the law of the land and judgment of
peers, did not stand in the way.
Second, the Chancellor’s court of equity provided an alternative to jury trial. We
think of the equitable jurisdiction of the court of Chancery as limited to petitions in
which there was no remedy at common law, no remedy because of jurisdictional,
evidentiary, or substantive limits of the ordinary rules of common law.139 But a large
proportion of the petitions that came to the Chancellor in the late fourteenth and
fifteenth centuries were for ordinary assaults and batteries, disseisins, and other
wrongs for which there were regular, ordinary remedies at common law, but not for
these petitioners, because of maintenance by powerful lords.140 Sheriffs would not
135 See, e.g., SELECTED READINGS, supra note 1, at 236; Charles Donahue, Jr., What
Happened in the English Legal System in the Fourteenth Century and Why Would Anyone
Want to Know?, 63 SMU L. REV. 949, 963 (2010) (discussing the change of focus from real
actions to personal actions).
136 Anon., Mich. 19 Hen. 6, pl. 38, fol. 17b–18b (C.P.) (1440.056) (Newton C.J.C.P.);
Hoton’s Case, Hil. 19 Hen. 6, pl. 3, fol. 48b (C.P.) (1441.003) (Newton C.J.C.P.); Cromwell
v. Duke of Exeter, Mich. 32 Hen. 6, pl. 14, fol 9a (C.P.) (1453.027) (Sjt. Billyng); Anon.,
Trin. 33 Hen. 6, pl. 4, fol. 24b (C.P.) (1455.056) (Prysot C.J.C.P.).
137 Hoton’s Case, Hil. 19 Hen. 6, pl. 3, fol. 48b (C.P.) (1441.003) (Newton C.J.C.P.).
138 The origins of the fictitious Bill of Middlesex are most fully considered in MARJORIE
BLATCHER, THE COURT OF KING’S BENCH, 1450–1550: A STUDY IN SELF-HELP 111–37 (1978).
139 See Patrick Devlin, Jury Trial in Complex Cases: English Practice at the Time of the
Seventh Amendment, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 43, 52 n.26 (1980); Chancery Jurisdiction, 2 AM.
JURIST & L. MAG. 314, 315 (1829).
140 William Paley Baildon, Introduction to SELECT CASES IN CHANCERY, A.D. 1364 TO
1471, at 10 SS xxii (London, Bernard Quaritch 1896) (listing a dozen representative petitions
that stated that the plaintiffs could not proceed at common law because of power and
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serve their writs on well-connected defendants, and juries could not be found who
would convict the guilty. So petitioners begged the Chancellor to intervene. The
Chancellor could order persons to appear before him and explain themselves, and
could back up his orders by imposing large fines. The petitioner hoped that maybe
the Chancellor, the most powerful of the king’s officers of state, would override
even a very powerful lord and do some kind of justice in the case, without the need
to try to wrest a fair decision from an impressionable, easily intimidated jury.
At the end of the fifteenth century, the king’s council began sitting as another
court, called Star Chamber, again without juries, set up specially to discipline the
nobility, those whom ordinary courts and ordinary legal proceedings could not reach.141
Later, under strong kings like Henry VIII and his successors, Star Chamber was used
against those who opposed the king and his ministers.142 Its name became the symbol
of an evil, tyrannical court. In the seventeenth century, Englishmen waving copies
of Magna Carta abolished Star Chamber and stopped just short of abolishing the
Court of Chancery.143 One of their complaints was that Star Chamber and Chancery
deprived Englishmen of their right to trial by jury, a right guaranteed by Magna Carta.
Third, arbitration replaced jury trial. Litigation in the courts of common law
risked large sums of money, vast tracts of land, personal liberty, or life itself on a
winner-take-all pleading strategy or a jury’s verdict. Arbitration risked losing half
or more of what litigation might give you and accepting instead a split-the-difference
award from the arbitrators.144 Edward Powell, in the second of his excellent 1983
and 1984 articles about arbitration in fifteenth-century England, showed that lawyers
and judges did not view arbitration as an enemy of the common law. Instead, he
wrote, “[t]he two were used in conjunction, and often simultaneously, as alternative
means to the same end of securing the favorable resolution of a dispute.”145 There
violence exerted by or on behalf of the defendants); see Melville M. Bigelow, 2 AM. HIST.
REV. 718, 718–19 (1897) (reviewing SELECT CASES IN CHANCERY, supra).
141 The statute Pro Camera Stellata, 3 Hen. 7, ch. 1, 2 STAT. REALM 509 (1487) specified
unlawful maintenance as the first of the offences over which the Court of Star Chamber would
have jurisdiction. See I. S. Leadem, Introduction to 2 SELECT CASES BEFORE THE KING’S
COUNCIL IN THE STAR CHAMBER, A.D. 1477–1509, 16 SS lxv–lxvi (I. S. Leadem ed., 1903).
142 See J. A. GUY, THE CARDINAL’S COURT: THE IMPACT OF THOMAS WOLSEY IN STAR
CHAMBER 76–78 (1977); Henry E.I. Phillips, The Last Years of the Court of Star Chamber
1630–41, 21 TRANSACTIONS ROYAL HIST. SOC’Y 115, 120–23 (4th ser. 1939); Daniel C.
Vande Zande, Coercive Power and the Demise of the Star Chamber, 50 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
326, 334–35 (2010).
143 The statute abolishing Star Chamber, 16 Charles 1, ch. 10, 5 STAT. REALM 110 (1641),
began with an invocation of Magna Carta, chapter 29. On how close Parliament came in 1653
to abolishing Chancery, see Stuart E. Prall, Chancery Reform and the Puritan Revolution,
6 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 28, 30, 35–37 (1962).
144 See Edward Powell, Settlement of Disputes by Arbitration in Fifteenth-Century England,
2 LAW & HIST. REV. 21, 36 (1984).
145 Id. at 38; see also Edward Powell, Arbitration and the Law in England in the Late
Middle Ages, 33 TRANSACTIONS ROYAL HIST. SOC’Y 49, 64 (1983) (on resort to Chancery).
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was certainly a lot more talk about arbitration. Roughly one in thirty fifteenth-century
Year Books mentioned arbitration, compared to roughly one in 400 fourteenth-century
Year Books. Lords and royal justices were often asked to act as arbitrators.146 A small,
well-chosen group of prominent arbitrators were far less susceptible to intimidation
and manipulation than a jury.
In the lawless fifteenth century, Magna Carta played a limited role. One reason
was that Magna Carta was meant to restrain a powerful king. For most of the fif-
teenth century, England’s legal system had the opposite problem, a succession of
weak or ineffectual kings who needed to be empowered by the law, not thwarted by
it. The second reason was that Magna Carta entrusted the liberty of the king’s sub-
jects to the law of the land and judgment of their peers, but powerful magnates had
made such protections far too insecure in too many cases. The law of the land had
come to mean the ordinary rules of common law. Judgment of one’s peers would soon
come to mean trial by jury. These were only guarantees of right and justice so long
as no powerful lord sought to interfere with legal proceedings, or so long as the king
was powerful enough to prevent such interference. Trial by jury and kings securely
under the thumb of the law were not the answer to fifteenth-century problems in
England’s legal system. For the time, Magna Carta was in eclipse.
146 See, e.g., Joseph Biancalana, The Legal Framework of Arbitration in Fifteenth-Century
England, 47 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 347, 351, 357 (2005); M. A. Hicks, Restraint, Mediation and
Private Justice: George, Duke of Clarence as Good Lord, 4 J. LEGAL HIST. 56, 63, 68 (1983).
